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Abstract
This paper addresses the validity of certification and insider selling
hypotheses within the context of new issues. Comparisons of venture
capital backed and non venture-backed issues with similar offering
characteristics show that issuers with venture capital affiliation are more
underpriced than non venture-backed IPOs and insider selling results in
decreased underpricing. These results contradict the findings of previous
venture capital certification studies {Barry (1990), Megginson and Weiss
(1991), and Lin and Smith (1997)}, but are consistent with recent work
that examines grandstanding {Lee and Wahal (2002)} and insider selling
decisions during hot market periods {Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003)}.
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I. Introduction
The topic of venture capitalist involvement with initial public offerings has
garnered much attention in contemporary finance research. The bulk of academic studies
focus on the venture capitalist’s ability to certify issues and reduce underpricing.1 Barry
et al (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) pioneered the study of venture capital
certification. The findings of those studies show that venture capitalists are able to
credibly certify the quality of their issues through monitoring activities, with the end
result being reduced underpricing. Additionally, Lin and Smith (1997) examine the roll of
insider selling decisions on initial returns. They find that the selling of lead venture
capitalists during the IPO period adversely affects underpricing of issues. Recent works
in corporate finance studies have shown reversed results from previous studies. Gompers
(1996) examines the phenomenon of grandstanding undertaken by younger venture
capitalists in order to showcase financing talents. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) observe
the effects of insider selling decisions on issuer underpricing in the context of bubble
markets.
This study focuses on examining the strength of certification and insider selling
hypotheses during the 1990s new issues market in the United States. Previous models call
for certification by venture capitalists to decrease underpricing and insider selling to
heighten underpricing during the first day of trading. The study employs a set of 1786
venture capital backed issues and a set of 1531 non venture capital backed issues with
similar offering characteristics from 1991-2001 to test the claims of certification.
Additionally 1505 VC-backed issues from 1991-2001 are used to test insider selling

1

The terms underpricing and initial returns will be used interchangeably throughout the study.
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decisions during the IPO period on subsequent initial returns.2 The results indicate that
the presence of venture capitalists results in increased underpricing for issuers. Increased
insider selling significantly decreases underpricing.
Specifically, the paper presents current research that may explain the differing
results from previous studies. The grandstanding hypothesis developed by Gompers
(1996) may explain systematic underpricing of venture-backed issues during the 1990s.
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) use data from the hot market period of the late 1990s to
explore incentives facing insiders’ selling decisions during the IPO period. They present
evidence of insiders’ abilities to minimize underpricing in order to maximize gains from
liquidation of holdings.
The paper is organized in the following fashion: Section 2 gives a general
overview of the new issues environment in the United States from 1991-2001. Section 3
outlines the literature related to both initial public offerings and venture capital
certification. Section 4 describes the methodological approach for testing previous
models. Section 5 presents the data used for testing. Section 6 provides the empirical
results of the certification and insider selling test. Section 7 concludes.

2

Only 1505 issues with venture backing had pertinent information on insider selling during the IPO period.
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II. Overview of New Issues in the United States from 1991-2001
The market for Initial Public Offerings in the United States during the period from
1991-2001 shows several underlying trends. The total number of issues tracked by
Thomson SDC Global New Issues was 5997 during the time frame. Of that total, 1831
had some form of venture capital backing, with the other 4166 not having pre-IPO
relationships with venture capitalists.3 The frequency of issues during the time period
shows intense periods of equity offerings, followed by years of calmer activity. The
distribution of both venture capital backed and non venture capital backed IPOs gives
insight into the concentration of venture capitalists’ efforts in a narrow set of industries.
Table 1
Frequency distribution of 5997 public
common eq uity IPOs from 1991-2001,
including 1831 venture capital backed new issues and 4166 w ithout venture capital
backing.
Venture Capital
Backed Firms

Firms without
Venture Capital
Backing

Total Issues

Percent of
Venture Capital
Backed Firms

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

149
197
230
146
180
268
128
63
232
218
20

252
409
587
497
397
606
503
329
308
169
109

401
606
817
643
577
874
631
392
540
387
129

37.16
32.51
28.15
22.71
31.20
30.66
20.29
16.07
42.96
56.33
15.50

Totals

1831

4166

5997

30.53

3

Firms with private equity backing are not included in the same group as VC backed offerings. Since most
private equity investments occur after a LBO or spin-off, these issues are not included with venture capital
backed issues. This is done in order to focus on the financing issues surrounding early stage companies.

4

http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje

Table 1 shows no single underlying trend in IPO volume during the 1990s. New
issues were at an all time high during 1993 and 1996.4 The low peaks for IPOs occurred
in 1998, 1999, and 2001. The hot IPO issue periods followed bull market years.5 Total
IPOs during 1993 and 1996 were 817 and 874, respectively. Market returns for 1992 and
1995 were 4.46% and 34.1%, respectively. The market returns for the years preceding the
low point for the total number of new issues (1998, 1999, 2001) were 31.5%, 26.6%, and
10.0%, respectively. Financing of firms with venture capital backing was heavily
concentrated in the latter part of the sample period. Venture capital backed new issues,
measured as a percentage of all new issues, peaked during 1999 and 2000. These periods
were preceded by hot market years. The returns on the market index during 1998 and
1999 were 26.66% and 19.52%, respectively. Lerner (1994) argues that venture
capitalists can accurately time the sale of new issues to coincide with hot markets.
However, the low points for VC backed issues also follow years of strong market
performance. The market returns preceding cool periods of VC backed issues were
20.26% and 31%, respectively.
The largest number of offerings involved high technology firms (1395), followed
by financial services (845), healthcare (777), consumer products and services (574), and
industrials (493). Table 2 shows the entire breakdown of IPOs by industry. Barry (1990)

4

Note: This overview only addresses the total number of new issues. It does not take into account total
issue size. The late 1990s saw several very large issues.

5

All information on market returns is taken from Yahoo! Finance, using the S&P 500 Index as the
“market” and December 2nd as end of fiscal year for calculations purposes.
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suggests that venture capital firms concentrate their resources in a narrow set of
industries.6 Indeed VC backed offerings during the period were most noticeably
Table 2
Industry distribution of 5996 IPOs between 1991-2001, including 1831 venture capital
backed issues and 5996 issues without venture capital backing.
Firms without
Venture Capital
Backing
High Technology
Healthcare
Financials
Consumer Products and Svcs.
Materials
Industrials
Consumer Staples
Retail
Energy and Power
Media and Entertainment
Telecommunications
Real Estate
Government and Agencies

Total

686
373
803
402
193
400
204
267
187
273
218
157
2
4165

Venture Capital
Backed Firms

709
404
42
172
39
93
34
92
35
60
148
3
0
1831

Total Issues

Percent of
Industry Issues
with VC Backing
1395
777
845
574
232
493
238
359
222
333
366
160
2
5996

Percent of Total
VC Issues

0.508
0.520
0.050
0.300
0.168
0.189
0.143
0.256
0.158
0.180
0.404
0.019
0.000

Note: The total of all new issues differs from the total listed in Table X due the lack of industry information on the issue that was excluded from this
list. All information was obtained from the SDC database.

concentrated in high technology and healthcare. VCs were involved with 50.8% of high
tech issues and 52.0% of all healthcare issues. High technology, healthcare, and
telecommunications comprise 68.9% off all venture-backed offers. Industries bereft of
VC involvement include financial services, real estate, energy, consumer staples, and
governmental agencies.
In summary, venture capital backed issues represented 30.5% of all new issues
during the 1991-2001 period. Periods of intense venture capital involvement were
preceded by years with large returns for the market index. Venture capital backed firms

6

The authors’ work shows that the largest industries with VC involvement include computer equipment,
electronic components, and business services. The author used SIC codes to indicate issuer industry.
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0.387
0.221
0.023
0.094
0.021
0.051
0.019
0.050
0.019
0.033
0.081
0.002
0.000
1

concentrated resources in high technology and healthcare companies, while shying away
from financials, consumer staples, and energy.
III. Initial Public Offerings
The phenomenon of systematic underpricing has been a focal point of research in
initial public offerings for quite some time. Much of the literature focuses on
informational asymmetries facing investors, issuers, and third parties.7 Most of these
studies attribute underpricing to adverse selection, principal-agent models, or signaling of
firm quality. In this study I will only focus on an empirical implication of the Winner’s
Curse. The outcome of the Winner’s Curse is that uninformed investors only receive
allotments of shares in offerings that are overpriced (Rock, 1986). On average, the
“winner” ends up receiving negative average returns.8 The author shows that some action
is needed to induce uninformed investors to stay in the primary market. The end result is
systematic underpricing of every issue in order to keep the uninformed investors from
refusing to participate in the primary market of new issues. However, underpricing is
very costly to issuers, since this is a net transfer of wealth from existing shareholders to
new shareholders. Rock (1986) now goes on to show how the logic of deliberate
underpricing eventually leads to the classic free rider problem. In order to ensure the
future participation of uninformed investors, every issuer will have to deliberately
underprice their own shares. No one issuer will face enough incentive to leave money on
7

Notably public auditors, underwriters, and venture capital firms.
The underlying assumptions calls for both the underwriter and issuer to have information of the value of
the shares, but are not able to credibly signal this to the market. Some investors are informed, while most
remain uninformed as to the true value of the shares that are being offered. During an offering of
attractively priced shares informed investors bid, along with the uninformed investors. The uninformed
investors are crowded out and do not receive their total amount of bids during attractively priced offerings.
In offerings that are not priced attractively, the informed investors refrain from bidding, with all of the
shares going to the uninformed investors. On average, the uninformed investors only receive shares in
overpriced companies.

8
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the table in order to let future issuers benefit from this incremental cost faced by the
current firm. Issuers are one-time players in an initial public offering game, while
investors and third parties are repeat-players. Investment banks do face incentives to
bring high quality issues to market, mainly through future business from issuers and
increased market share from investors {see Nanda and Yun, 1997}.
One of the more popular proxies for uncertainty are offering characteristics of the
issuer and certification of the issuer by third parties. Much effort has been concentrated in
the effect of third parties on ex-ante uncertainty. Underwriters and venture capital firms
may also signal firm quality through repeatedly participating in high quality offerings.
Issuers can hire reputable auditors in order to reduce underpricing {see (Balvers et al.,
1988) and (Beatty, 1989)}. A pre-IPO equity investment undertaken by a venture capital
fund may additionally result in less ex-ante uncertainty {see (Barry et al., 1990),
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991), and (Lin and Smith, 1997)}. Empirical research on the
role of venture capital firms in the pricing of initial public offerings continues to remain
as a research hotspot and warrants sufficient room for further investigation.
A. Venture Capital
The Venture Capital industry is an amalgam of limited partners, general partners,
early stage companies, and, of course, money. VC firms provide sources of capital to
risky ventures when more traditional forms of financing, namely banks and retail
investors, are unavailable. Unlike mutual funds, venture capital funds are closed-end and
not open to retail investors. The legal entity of choice for any venture capital firm is the
limited liability corporation. The management team of any venture capital firm serves as
general partners. The managing partners of any venture capital firm typically bring a
8
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje

myriad of knowledge and expertise in a certain industry to the table. Savvy acumen is
needed, since venture capitalists play a large role in development and strategic decision
making for portfolio companies. This is where the venture capital firm differs from
traditional money managers or investment funds. Venture capitalists take an active role in
management of the company. They take seats on the board of directors and use their
contacts in the specific industry in order to develop a client base and streamline
operations. From an economic standpoint, a venture capitalist seeks to “add-value” to the
firms in his or her portfolio.
There are three distinct stages to any venture capital investment. The cycle starts
with the raising of capital that is invested in entrepreneurial ventures. Capital is usually
provided by sophisticated investors such as wealthy individuals, institutional investors,
and university endowment funds. The second stage of the cycle is the financing and
active management of the funded venture. The venture capitalist takes an active role in
managing the enterprise, monitoring performance, and partaking in any other value-added
activities. The fund typically provides some form of staged financing to the enterprise.
This is done in order to avert any agency problems faced between the principal (venture
capitalist) and agent (entrepreneur) (Sahlman, 1990). The general partner in the fund
must be compensated for both his active involvement in the company and the opportunity
costs of not investing in other risky ventures. The final stage involves the process of
unwinding investment in the business. The most common strategy used to liquidate the
venture capitalists position is an initial public offering of the company’s shares on an

9
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exchange (Gladstone, 1989).9 However, according to Barry (1990), companies often
retain partial ownership in the issuer after the first day of trading on public markets in
order to signal quality of the monitoring efforts There is no clear-cut rule in the
investment community as to the ability of venture capitalists to time issues. However
Lerner (1994) asserts that seasoned venture capital professionals possess and employ
their abilities to take issues public in peak market conditions.
B. Venture Capitalist Certification Models
The role of certification provided by Venture capitalists through reputation capital
and monitoring efforts has been a major area of research in Initial Public offerings in the
past fifteen years. The first study to analyze the role of venture capitalists in bringing new
issues to the market was undertaken by Barry et al (1990). The authors of this body of
work find that venture capitalists specialize in a narrow set of industries and are able to
bring in better underwriters to the issuing process. They also hold significant positions in
firms after the issuance on the primary market. This disagrees with Gladstone’s (1989)
view that the IPO is an exit vehicle for VC firms. Finally, Barry states that the reputation
and monitoring role undertaken by venture capitalists is recognized by the markets,
resulting in lower underpricing. An interesting caveat to this study is the fact that VCbacked issues do not have significantly lower initial returns than non-VC backed issues.
However, the author noted that this is most probably due to the method of data collection
of the firms that did not have relationships with venture capitalists pre-IPO.10 For the

9

Gladstone (1989) outlines other forms of venture capital exits include sale of shares to other companies,
share repurchases by company, reorganization of the company, liquidation of the company’s assets, or a
private placement to another investor or a consortium.
10
The authors used ads in the Wall Street Journal for non-venture capital backed firms. This sample may be
biased towards large firms.
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entire study the authors used a sample of 433 venture-backed and 1123 non venturebacked issues in the United States from 1978-1987.
Another study by Megginson and Weiss (1991) shows that the certification role
provided by VC firms results in lower underpricing. A treatment of means test and OLS
regression both provide statistical evidence that VC-backed firms are subject to lower
initial first-day returns than issuers without venture capital backing. The authors also
show that venture capitalists can attract higher quality auditors and underwriters than
non-VC backed firms.11 Additionally, venture capitalists refrain from selling after the
IPO, this is consistent with Barry’s (1990) findings. For the data set the authors used 320
VC-backed issues and a matched set of 320 non VC-backed issues from the US market in
1983-1987. The data was matched to include issues from similar industries with similar
offerings amounts.12
A third study provides convincing evidence for the reputation of venture capital
firms in the role of pricing initial public offerings. Lin and Smith (1997) state that venture
capitalists participate in relationships with younger issuers. These findings are consistent
with Megginson and Weiss (1991). However, Lin and Smith’s findings show that VCbacked issuers are less profitable and have fewer assets than issuers without venture
capital backing. The authors find that venture capitalists’ marginal level of productivity
diminishes as the age of the firm increases. Their evidence shows that they reduce equity
positions in firms in order to redeploy their services to other firms. This disagrees with
11

Megginson and Weiss (1991) argue that VCs develop reputations with underwriters and auditors. They
continue to state that since venture capitalists have their reputation capital on the line, then they have
incentive to reveal truthful information to the auditors and underwriters. This reduces the costs (due
diligence and information gathering) to the auditors and underwriters. Therein lies the ability to attract
higher quality third party players.
12
Every effort was made to exclude financial institutions, offerings less than $5 in price, and issues with
total offering amounts less than $3 million.
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both Barry (1991) and Megginson and Weiss (1991). However, Lin and Smith use a 3year horizon to measure ownership levels, whereas the other authors use immediate postIPO data. Finally, the authors show that the selling decisions of reputable lead venture
capitalists influences the level of underpricing. When reputable lead investors elect not to
sell during the IPO, underpricing is significantly lower than when reputable insiders
choose to sell equity stakes.
All of the certification studies used data from new issues listed on US capital
markets. Studies done with data from other countries show much different results and
may provide startling evidence against the certification hypothesis of venture capital
firms. A recent body of work by Hamao et al (2000) analyzes new public issues in
Japanese markets to test the strength of the certification model.13 The results of the study
are in stark contrast to the evidence that has been presented by Barry (1990), Megginson
and Weiss (1991), and Lin and Smith (1997). Hamao (2000) finds that venture capital
firms in Japan do not take an active monitoring role in portfolio companies14, hold
smaller equity stakes in the invested firms, and do not face a heavy high technology bias
when choosing companies for equity commitments. Additionally, Hamao (2000) finds
that underpricing is significantly greater for venture-backed new issues. However, when
the authors control certain variables15, the amount of underpricing is significantly

13

Much of the differences between the results of Barry (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991), and Lin and
Smith (1997) in relationship to the findings of Hamao (2000) may be attributed to structural organization of
the venture capital industry in Japan. In the Japanese market, venture capital firms are not organized as
partnerships. Instead, they are owned by banks, securities firms, and underwriters.
14
The reason that venture capital firms do not take an active monitoring role in the portfolio companies is
due to legal and statutory rules. These rules were changed after 1995.
15
The controlled variables in the regression include: age (ln), amount of IPO proceeds (ln), market return
of the OTC index from the first day of auction to the first day of trading, book equity to market value
equity based on lower limit of bids (ln), and time period dummy variables.

12

http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje

decreased for firms with venture capital backing. Initial returns are significantly higher
for VC-backed companies when the lead underwriter owns the venture capital firm.
A recent study on returns of US issues during the bubble period of the 1990s
shines new light onto venture capitalists’ effects on new issue pricing. Ljungqvist and
Wilhelm (2003) show that runaway underpricing during 1999 and 2000 can be explained
by incentives faced by firms involved with the issues. While this study does not strictly
focus on certification roles of venture capitalists, it does uncover new information on the
relationship between insider selling decisions and underpricing. The results of the study
show that increases in venture capital and insider selling during the issue period tend to
reduce underpricing. This study uses data from 1996-2000. It is one of the first studies to
analyze the role of VC’s during the hot market area of the last decade ending in 2000.
Perhaps future findings might reveal a differing role of venture capitalists in hot markets.
IV. Analytical Framework
Asymmetric information is an underlying theme within modern IPO framework.
Inside investors have incentive to hide or delay disclosure of material information that
could hurt the price of the offering. Rational investors recognize this by submitting lower
average offers for the prices of these securities. Only credible certification from a third
party will prevent a market failure similar to that of the lemon car model. Enter venture
capitalists.
Venture capital firms engage in costly activities that can add a sense of
certification to the involved issuer. VCs face extreme risk-to-reward ratios, since they
usually invest in emerging companies that are clustered within certain industries. The
venture capitalist provides funding to the entrepreneurial venture in a series of rounds,
13
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje

usually connected to different stages in the life of the business. However venture
capitalists are more than just silent partners that use private businesses as an investment
vehicle. Like leverage-buyout and private equity firms, they are heavily involved in the
operational and strategic facets of an organization. VCs line-up suppliers, sit on the board
of directors, and formulate business plans. They help “add-value” to their portfolio
companies. Indeed, most venture capitalists have held operational and management
positions within the industries that they cover. Since venture capitalists are heavily
involved with the development of their respective issuers, they are able to credibly certify
the financial status of the issuers.
Venture capitalists are repeat players in the new issues market. They seek to add
value to emerging technological ventures in order to reap the rewards of selling shares in
open and liquid markets. Since VCs have to repeatedly face the same investors in capital
markets, they need to develop relationships with these investors. Venture capital firms
face strong incentives to invest in activities that lead to a favorable image amongst capital
market participants, namely investors. The main ‘investment’ is avoiding the one-time
gains of bringing overvalued companies public. Megginson and Weiss (1991) show that
these one-time gains destroy part of the firm’s reputation capital. Venture capitalists seek
to develop a reputation for selling high quality issues. Lin and Smith (1997) show that
reputable firms forego participating in the sales of overpriced issues.
Venture capital firms must eventually liquidate their holdings in the
entrepreneurial ventures once they gain listing on a public exchange. VCs do not derive
their competitive advantage or value-added services from monitoring the operations of
established business. Their marginal productivity is highest when they are involved with
14
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje

emerging companies. The services of venture capitalists are put to better use while
engaging in monitoring activities of new firms, rather than just holding directorship
positions with publicly traded companies. However, the selling decisions of venture
capitalists during the IPO phase do not go unnoticed by capital market participants. Any
selling during the offering can be negatively perceived and endanger the reputation
capital of the VC. Lin and Smith (1997) argue that venture capital firms balance their
selling decisions with the opportunity cost of not transferring their monitoring services
and investment capital to other ventures. Ultimately, the selling decisions of venture
capitalists during the new issue offering period have important ramifications for both the
venture capitalist and issuers.
In summary, previous models show that the monitoring role (of venture
capitalists) is noticed by capital markets participants and the selling decisions of venture
capitalists and insiders can affect the pricing of new issues. These models yield two
testable hypotheses:
1) Since venture capitalists certify the quality of their issues, then firms that are
backed by venture capital investors should face lower underpricing than firms
without venture capital backing.
2) The relative liquidation of insider holdings during the IPO process should
adversely affect the pricing of the issue. Therefore, for issues where venture
capitalists substantially reduce their holdings during the IPO process, the level
of underpricing should increase.

15
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V. Data Selection
For this study I used a set of 1786 venture capital backed issues and 1531 issues
without venture capital financing from the period January 1, 1991 through December 31,
2001 with primary listings on exchanges in the United States.16 The issues are closely
matched on the basis of industry and offering amount. All of the primary data was
obtained from Thomson SDC Platinum Global New Issues database. For the entire period
(1/1/1991-12/31/01) SDC contained a total of 5997 new issues listed on U.S. markets. Of
that set, 1831 were identified as having venture capital backing. This entire set of new
issues proved too unwieldy for the testable hypotheses.
Table 3
Industry distribution of 3317 IPOs between 1991-2001, including 1786 venture
capital backed issues and 1531 issues without venture capital backing.
Non-VC
Industry
High Technology
Healthcare
Materials
Industrials
Consumer Prod.
Consumer Staples
Telecommunications
Retail
Energy and Power
Media and Ent.
Total

VC Backed

Number % of Total

Number % of Total

543
330
38
90
171
32
142

0.355
0.216
0.025
0.059
0.112
0.021
0.093

709
404
39
93
172
34
148

0.397
0.226
0.022
0.052
0.096
0.019
0.083

90
35
60

0.059
0.023
0.039

92
35
60

0.052
0.020
0.034

1531

1786

Note: Financial services issues were excluded, along with offers under 5 million and offers over 400 million.

Since venture capital backed firms’ first day returns tend to be clustered by
industry (see Ritter (1984)), matching the samples by both offering size and industry
would provide better results for testing the hypotheses. First, all IPOs that were classified
16

This includes the American Stock Exchange, Nasdaq, Nasdaq Small Cap Markets, New York Stock
Exchange, and OTC traded issues.
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as either financial services or real estate firms by the T-F Macro Industry list on SDC
Global New Issues were eliminated.17 Secondly, only issues within the amount offered
range of $5 million to $400 million were included. Finally, a set of 1786 VC-backed and
1531 non VC-backed issues with similar offering amounts and industry affiliations were
used to perform the testing. Table 3 shows distribution of issues by industry and Table 4
shows the frequency distribution of IPOs by offer amount. For the testing on underpricing
and selling decisions, 1505 VC-backed firms with available insider selling data were used
(these firms were taken out of the previous set of 1786 VC-backed issues).
Table 4
Distribution of offering amounts for 1531 IPOs without venture-backing and 1786
IPOs with venture-backing from 1991-2001, excluding financial services issues and
those with offering amounts less than 5 million and greater than 400 million. All
offer amounts in millions.
Percentile
10th
20th
30th
40th
50th
60th
70th
80th
90th

Non-VC

VC

15
20
25
30
35
41.9
50.1
63.7

15.8
21.38
25
30
33
40
48.92
60

87.5

82.5

17

This follows the basic procedure used by Megginson and Weiss (1991). That study included a sample of
320 non VC-backed and VC-backed issues listed on US markets between 1983-1987. Both sets were
matched closely by industry and offering amount. All
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VI. Empirical Results
A. Venture Capitalist Certification
1. Regression Analysis
Tests of the venture capital certification hypothesis and its application to first day returns
are presented in Table 5. I examined the following variables and their relationship to the
first day returns of new issues:

(1) Venture Capital Dummy Variable (VC).
Initial returns of VC backed firms (VC=1) should be lower than the returns of
non VC-backed issues (VC=0). Since capital markets take into account the
monitoring role of venture capital firms, there should be a negative and
significant relationship between (VC) and first day returns.
(2) Issue offering amount (AMOUNT).
Controlling for size allows for a better relative measure of VC backing.
(3) Industry Dummy Variables (IND1, IND2, IND3, IND4).
The High Technology (IND1=1), healthcare (IND2=1), personal/business
products and services (IND3=1), media (IND4=1), energy (IND5=1), retail
(IND6=1), and materials (IND7=1) industries have been included in order to
separate the effect of issuer industry on initial returns from that of venture
capital certification.
(4) Issue year dummy variables (YEAR1, YEAR2, YEAR3, YEAR4, YEAR5).
Dummy variables are used in order to control for IPO and market activity
within certain yearly trading sessions. Hot market periods, especially 1995199918, (YEAR5=1, YEAR6=1, YEAR7=1, YEAR8=1, YEAR9=1) were a
boon for IPO first day returns. Therefore, those variables should be positively
related to initial returns. Issues during bear markets (YEAR00=1,
YEAR01=1) should have a negative correlation to initial returns, however,
these could have either a significant or insignificant value. The issue dummy
variables during other years (YEAR2=1, YEAR3=1, YEAR4=1) should have
an insignificant relationship with initial returns.

18

The yearly returns for the S&P 500 during the ‘hot market’ periods of 1995-1999 were 34.1%, 20.26%,
31%, 26.66%, and 19.52%, respectively. The returns for the ‘bear market’ years of 2000 and 2001 were –
10.01% and –13.04%, respectively. The returns for the remaining years 1991-1994 were 21.12%, 4.46%,
7.05%, and –1.5%, respectively. All yearly returns were calculated using December 2nd as year-end. All
data was obtained from Yahoo Finance.
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Table 5 outlines the results of the statistical analyses of the effects of venture
capital backing, offer amount, year of issue, and industry on underpricing of both
venture-backed and non VC issues. The results show a reversal of the trends from prior
Table 5
OLS Regression results from Day 1 Returns (R1) against VC backing (TYPE),
offering amount (OFFER), Year of Issue Indicators (YEAR1, YEAR2, YEAR3,
YEAR4, YEAR5), and Industry of Issuer Indicators (TYPE1, TYPE2, TYPE3,
TYPE4, TYPE5, TYPE6) for the sample of 1786 VC backed firms and 1531 firms
without venture capital backing.
R1 =
α0+α1TYPE+α2OFFER+α3YEAR1+α4YEAR2+α5YEAR3+α6YEAR4+α7YEAR5+α8IND1+α9IND2+α10IND3+
α11IND4+α12IND5+α12IND6+εi
Dependent Var.:
INTERCEPT
TYPE
OFFER

{1}

{2}

{3}

{4}

0.249
{16.575}
0.077
{3.733}

0.192
{9.980}
0.079
{3.859}
0.001
{4.745}

0.185
{8.121}
0.067
{3.357}
0.001
{2.904}
-0.005
{-0.143}
-0.098
{-3.491}
-0.124
{-3.778}
-0.029
{-0.687}
0.522
{17.192}

0.106
{0.033}
0.058
{2.943}
0.001
{2.629}
-0.017
{-0.495}
-0.091
{-3.291}
-0.130
{-4.009}
-0.058
{-1.381}
0.460
{15.016}
0.203
{6.575}
0.004
{0.114}
-0.005
{-0.103}
-0.087
{-1.278}
0.197
{4.734}
0.046
{1.162}

YEAR1
YEAR2
YEAR3
YEAR4
YEAR5
IND1
IND2
IND3
IND4
IND5
IND6
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Adjusted R Squared

0.004

0.010

0.117

0.143

R1=
HOLD=
AMOUNT=
YEAR=

Percentage return from offer price to closing price on first day of trading.
Percentage decrease in insider holdings during the IPO period.
Offering amount in millions.
Indicator (dummy) variables for various issue years (YEAR1 1995=1, non=0; YEAR2 1996=1, non=0; YEAR3
1997=1, non=0; YEAR4 1998=1, non=0; YEAR5 1999=1, non=0).
IND=
Indicator (dummy) variables for various industries. (IND1 High Technology=1,non=0; IND2
Healthcare=1,non=0; IND3 Retail=0, non=1; IND4 Materials=1, non=0; IND5 Telecommunications=1, non=0).
All values significant at the .05 level.

VC certification studies. Ultimately, the findings question the prior results of Barry
(1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991), and Lin and Smith (1997).
The most marked departure from previous work is the positive and significant
coefficient attached to the venture capital indicator. This signifies that the presence of
venture capitalists in the sample positively affected initial returns. The value remains
significant after controlling for offer amount, year of issue, and industry of issuer. A
treatment of means test reiterates these results.19 This completely contradicts the findings
of Barry (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Lin and Smith (1997), all of whom
outline reduced underpricing through certification. However, the results are consistent
with Lee and Wahal (2002). One explanation for systematic underpricing of venturebacked issues could possibly be widespread grandstanding. Gompers (1996) hypothesizes
that young venture capital firms often face problems in raising capital for their funds,
since their capabilities have not been demonstrated. In order to signal their abilities, they
bring firms public at a younger age in order to showcase their talents in financing
startups. Since these firms are brought to market at an earlier age, there is more
surrounding uncertainty towards the issuer’s prospects resulting in more underpricing
than normal. The author’s tests show that companies brought to market by younger VCs

19

The difference in mean initial returns between VC-backed and non-VC issues (.0774) is significant at the
.05 level, showing that VC-backed issues have higher initial returns than non venture-backed issues. (t-stat:
–7.66).
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(those less than 3 years old) are, on average, younger and subject to higher initial returns.
Perhaps the 1990s saw an influx of venture capital firms eager to bring new ideas to the
market (internet concerns) and saw grandstanding as the only plausible way to establish a
track record, with the result being widespread underpricing of venture capital backed
issues. Additionally, the author states that positive performance of new issues provides
more incentives for grandstanding. The work of Lee and Wahal (2002) attributes
increasing initial returns for venture-backed firms to a variant of the grandstanding
hypothesis.
The issuer’s offering amount significantly affects underpricing in the sample,
differing from Lin and Smith (1997). Year of issue and industry influenced firm
underpricing. The indicators for 1996 and 1997 were negative and significant. Three
other indicator variables provide some insight into the underpricing of issues during the
test period. The coefficient on the control variable for issues in 1999 is positive and
significant.20 In their study, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) state that the rampant
underpricing of the late 90s may be attributed to the difficulty of valuing new economy
issues.21 Additionally, the indicator variable for high tech and telecommunications
companies is positive and significant. This could suggest that these companies are subject
to greater first day returns than other industries. Since many of the companies in
Ljungqvists’s (2003) valuation problem are internet firms, this result pays credence to the
authors’ study.

20

The coefficient remains significant when controlling for issuer industry. See Table 5 for complete results
of the OLS Regression on initial returns.
21
The authors conclude that certain omitted variables in their tests may explain the level of underpricing in
the bubble markets of the late 1990s. They explain that the issuers during this period chose an IPO as a
means to raise capital for operational activities. This is different from the reasons that firms choose to go
public in prior markets. As a result, investors may find it more difficult to value such issues.
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Tests of the sample indicate that the certification effect of venture capitalists
disappears during the period of the 1990s. This goes directly against the previous studies
on initial public offerings and venture capital involvement. One possible explanation for
the higher initial returns of VC-backed issues could be extensive grandstanding during
the 1990s.
B. Underpricing and Insider Selling Decisions
1. Regression Analysis
Tests of the selling decisions of venture capitalists during the IPO period and
subsequent effects on first day returns are presented in Table 6. I examined the following
variables and their relationship to the first day returns of new issues:

(1)

Reduction in insider holdings during IPO period (SELL).
The percentage reduction of insider holdings during the IPO period. This
variable analyzes the relationship between the selling decisions of venture
capitalists and the subsequent effect on initial returns. Lin and Smith
(1997) show that initial underpricing is reduced when reputable lead
managers refrain from selling. Therefore, there should be a negative
relationship between (SELL) and initial returns.

(2)

Offer amount of issuer, in millions of dollars (OFFER).
Controlling for size allows for a better relative measure of VC backing.

(3)

Industry Dummy Variables (IND1, IND2, IND3, IND4).
The High Technology (IND1=1), healthcare (IND2=1), personal/business
products and services (IND3=1), media (IND4=1), energy (IND5=1),
retail (IND6=1), and materials (IND7=1) industries have been included in
order to separate the effect of issuer industry on initial returns from that of
venture capital certification.

(4)

Issue year dummy variables (YEAR1, YEAR2, YEAR3, YEAR4, YEAR5).
Dummy variables are used in order to control for IPO and market activity
within certain yearly trading sessions. Hot market periods, especially
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1995-199922, (YEAR5=1, YEAR6=1, YEAR7=1, YEAR8=1, YEAR9=1)
were a boon for IPO first day returns. Therefore, those variables should be
positively related to initial returns.

Table 6 shows results that diverge from previous studies that document the
relationship between insider selling and initial returns of new offerings. These results
generally differ from the work of Lin and Smith (1997) in the area of venture capital
selling decisions. However, the results show similarities to the recent findings of
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003).
In all of the regression tests, the coefficient on the insider selling variable is
positive and significant. This shows that for issues with a higher level of reduction of
insider holdings, undepricing is actually reduced. Additionally, the coefficient decreases
as more control variables are added, suggesting that underpricing is dependent upon a
larger amount of factors than just insider selling decisions. Regardless of controlling for
hot market periods and industry of issuer, a larger amount of insider selling significantly
decreases the amount of underpricing. This is in stark contrast to previous studies in the
selling decisions of venture capitalists. Lin and Smith (1997) show that underpricing is
reduced when the lead venture capitalist refrains from liquidating its equity position in
the issue. As previously noted, the results are consistent with tests of issues from the hot
market period of the 1990s. The Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) empirical tests identify
the fact that insider (especially Venture Capital) selling reduces underpricing in hot

22

The yearly returns for the S&P 500 during the ‘hot market’ periods of 1995-1999 were 34.1%, 20.26%,
31%, 26.66%, and 19.52%, respectively. The returns for the ‘bear market’ years of 2000 and 2001 were –
10.01% and –13.04%, respectively. The returns for the remaining years 1991-1994 were 21.12%, 4.46%,
7.05%, and –1.5%, respectively. All yearly returns were calculated using December 2nd as year-end. All
data was obtained from Yahoo Finance.
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markets. The logic behind reduced underpricing and greater liquidation of insider
holdings rests with the incentives faced by insiders. The author assumes that venture
capitalists and insiders are able to influence the offering price of shares. Since
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Table 6
Results of OLS Regressions of First Day Returns (R1) against the Decrease in Insiders’
Holdings (HOLD), the Offering Amount of the Issuer (AMOUNT), Year of Issue Indicators
(YEAR1,YEAR2,YEAR3,YEAR4,YEAR5), and Issuer Industry Indicators
(IND1,IND2,IND3,IND4,IND5)
For the sample of 1505 VC Backed Initial Public Offerings during the period 1/1/199112/31-2001.
R1=α0+α1HOLD+α2AMOUNT+α3YEAR1+α4YEAR2+α5YEAR3+α6YEAR4+α7YEAR5+α8IND1+α9IND2+α10IND
3+α11IND4+α12IND5+εi

Regression INTERCEPT HOLD AMOUNT YEAR1 YEAR2 YEAR3 YEAR4 YEAR5

{1}

{2}

0.5612
[18.702]
0.4567
[12.294]

{3}

0.3753
[9.7402]

{4}

0.2902
[5.9196]

IND1

IND2

IND3 IND4

IND5

0.8512
[9.002]
0.7937

R2

0.0512

0.0020

0.0649

[8.3812] [4.7062]
0.6100

0.0010

0.0292 -0.0980 -0.0955 0.0342

[6.9122] [2.6618]
0.5319

0.0011

0.6761

0.2063

[.5793] [-2.2371] [-1.6817] [.4283] [14.8486]
0.0114 -0.0950 -0.1203 0.0033

0.6205

0.1721 -0.0328 -0.0222 -0.1000 0.0961 0.2262

[6.0129] [2.9275] [0.2295] [-2.2748] [-1.8189] [0.0420] [13.4932] [4.3934] [-0.7270] [-0.3138] [-0.9707] [1.6455]

R1=
HOLD=
AMOUNT=
YEAR=

Percentage return from offer price to closing price on first day of trading.
Percentage decrease in insider holdings during the IPO period.
Offering amount in millions.
Indicator (dummy) variables for various issue years (YEAR1 1995=1, non=0; YEAR2 1996=1, non=0; YEAR3 1997=1,
non=0; YEAR4 1998=1, non=0; YEAR5 1999=1, non=0).
IND=
Indicator (dummy) variables for various industries. (IND1 High Technology=1,non=0; IND2 Healthcare=1,non=0; IND3
Retail=0, non=1; IND4 Materials=1, non=0; IND5 Telecommunications=1, non=0).
All values significant at the .05 level.
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underpricing is costly to insiders (transfer of wealth from existing to new shareholders),
venture capitalists have an incentive to increase the offering price when they plan to cash
out their holdings during the IPO period. Thus, insider selling results in reduced
underpricing.
The offering amount of firms is significant and affects the amount of initial
returns for new issues. In all three equations the coefficient on amount offered is positive
and significant. This differs from Megginson and Weiss (1991), who show that offering
amounts of companies do not significantly affect initial returns. As in the underpricing
analysis, the indicators for 1999 and high technology were significant and positive.
The results from the ordinary least squares regression show that the selling
decisions positively affect underpricing. In other words, when venture capitalists choose
to sell a larger amount of holdings in the issuer during the IPO period, underpricing is
lowered when controlling for year of issue, offering amount, and industry of the issuer.
The departure from previous studies can be explained by a recent analysis of
underpricing in the bubble market of the late 1990s.

VII. Conclusions
The results of this paper provide evidence that the certification models may not
hold up under the hot market conditions of the 1990s. Tests on both non venture-backed
and venture-backed offerings with similar characteristics show that underpricing
increases with the presence of venture capitalists. These results are upheld when
controlling for certain factors such as offering amount, industry affiliation, and year of
offering. Positive market performance and increases in incentives for grandstanding by
26
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younger venture capital firms may explain some of the increase in initial returns for
venture-backed firms during the last decade. The grandstanding hypothesis has garnered
the attention of academics in recent years and should remain a bountiful source of future
study. More research in the area of increased capital infusions to venture capital funds
through grandstanding is needed in order to plausibly explain for the amount of
underpricing facing venture-backed issues in the 1990s.
The insider selling hypothesis which predicts that increased lead venture capitalist
selling results in increased underpricing also does not hold up under the data from the
1990s. Conversely, firms with increased venture capital selling during the IPO period
realized lower underpicing. Venture capitalists and other insiders can influence the
offering price of their issues and have incentive to price the issues higher when
liquidating their holdings, thus reducing costly underpricing occuring in the primary
market.
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